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Pictorial Decorum

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Introduction: Continuity, Discontinuity and Artistic Autonomy

In this chapter I wish to explore, through a particular problem in the philosophy of art, a constant tension that shapes aesthetic theory. The philosophical problem is the nature of artistic decorum (the notion will be explained below). The tension is between (i) the pull of conceptions of art that stress its *continuity* with life: e.g., those frameworks that seek to show how the visual, auditory, affective, cognitive, rational, and evaluative dimensions of works of art instantiate and can be explained by appeal to modes, concepts, and categories of experience generally; and (ii) the pull of approaches that stress *discontinuity*, e.g., those that seek to identify distinctive or peculiar conditions of artistic experience, such as proprietary "artistic emotions," artistic cognition, and so on, that are not of the same kind as their everyday counterparts.

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The emphasis on continuity in the philosophy of art realizes itself in various forms of reduction; dissolution of paradoxes through showing some putatively paradoxical behavior to be no more remarkable than ordinary behavior; and aspirations to greater explanatory power, theoretical simplicity, and often greater opportunity for empirical investigation, especially via the tools of cognitive science that were developed to study general affective, cognitive, and behavioral dispositions, not just those that come into play in our encounters with art. Finally, a hallmark of such continuity is the reference to art, in general, as a more primary explanandum than, say, particular styles, forms, movements, media, or techniques of art (let alone a particular work of art).

The emphasis on discontinuity, by contrast, is expressed in the identification of potentially *sui-generis* experiences of art, such as a kind of knowledge art alone can furnish or Schopenhauer's claim that music represents joy in general, not the everyday emotion that a person may have in response to some object or state of affairs; the stress on what may be ineffable in our engagement with art, not tractable in ordinary modes of measurement and scientific analysis; the autonomy of art in several registers; the essential embeddedness of certain kinds of expression in their artistic forms or media (as in the putative heresy of translation vis-à-vis poetry, or in Hegel's insistence that the thoughts which art expresses as a vehicle of Spirit's development do not exist prior to their expression via art.[1]); and, the emphasis on how aesthetic judgments can be objective while necessarily taking a first-person subjective form in which no reliance on authority or testimony is licit. Finally, such discontinuity tends to see individual works of art as potential counterexamples to general moral, metaphysical and epistemic theories, rather than as objects that call for redescription so as to eliminate whatever putative features made them seem to be exceptions calling for a distinctive analysis. For some thinkers, such as Flaubert writing in 1857, art's alternative to ordinary experience is a kind of refuge: "Life is a thing so hideous," he writes, "the only way to endure it is to escape it…by living in art." For others, art's disconnection from the real world is evinced in a *sui generis* kind of experience. Thus, in his lectures on literature, Nabokov cautions us to see each work of art as the "creation of a new world," and to approach it as "something brand new, having no obvious

connections with the world we already know." In some approaches, that sui generis experience putatively furnished by works of art is said to entail that they possess a meaning that cannot be expressed or conveyed invariantly across different forms.[2]

In this essay I don't, of course, try to resolve that tension between continuity and discontinuity, a tension that may indeed be constitutive of our relation to art, at least since the advent of Modernism. My more modest goal is to offer an account of a particular kind of evaluation of art that expresses that tension. This is a judgment of art that sees it as failing, in some sense, in virtue of standards that it sets for itself. This kind of judgment, which I associate with considerations of artistic decorum, embodies both the idea of continuity that art is subject to general norms that apply to all sorts of (non artistic) objects and experiences, and the idea of discontinuity that works of art should be evaluated with reference to their "own laws"—to criteria that emerge from the art itself.

Pictorial Decorum

A familiar way of criticizing an artistic representation is to say that it misrepresents its subject. Sometimes this is meant to suggest that the representation shows the subject (a person, an object, a scene, etc.) in a way that elicits false beliefs about the subject. But such misrepresentation may also occur when a subject is represented in a way that "doesn't do justice" to it, or in a way said to be "inapt," "unfitting," "unseemly," "unsuitable," or otherwise wrong. In such cases, the charge is not so much that the depiction shows the subject in ways that are inaccurate, as that it shows the subject in ways that the subject doesn't warrant.

In what follows I ask what it means to judge a work of art as failing to depict its subject in an appropriate way. I refer to such a judgment, when applied to visual art, as one of *pictorial decorum*. Such decorum concerns how the subjects of a picture ought to be represented. However, it is unclear what kind or kinds of normativity are at issue when we consider whether a picture represents its subject in the right way. That a subject warrants being shown possessing certain properties because it has those properties, may be only one of many considerations

in determining whether a pictorial representation is apt. As we will see, aesthetic, moral, cognitive and other considerations may also constrain whether the attribution of certain features to a subject is justified.

In "Pictorial Subjects and Modes of Depiction" and "Three Defects in Depiction" of this chapter, I describe a variety of cases that exemplify ways in which a work fails to render its subject in an adequate way. I look at three significant (but not exhaustive) kinds of reasons often introduced to justify the judgment that a work's form is inappropriate for its subject: (i) expressive reasons, (ii) cognitive reasons, and (iii) moral or political reasons. To say that a work exhibits a violation of decorum for expressive reasons is to hold that the subject is not rendered in an apt way given what meaning or expression the work is intended to convey. To say that a work's form doesn't fit its subject for cognitive reasons is to judge that the subject is rendered in a way that elicits a false understanding of the subject. Finally, to assert that a subject is misrepresented in moral terms is to suggest that it is shown from an immoral or politically objectionable point of view. In "Concepts, Saliencies, and Point of View", I ask how such violations of pictorial decorum are registered or embodied in the work of art. In other words, what property of the form in which a subject is represented grounds the violations of decorum? I propose that violations of pictorial decorum are instantiated in works of art as conflicts between *what is made salient* by the style, manner, or form of depiction and our *conception* (or broadly construed concept) of the object depicted.

Pictorial Subjects and Modes of Depiction

I begin with two examples of a failure of fit between style and subject. The first comes from a famous conversation that took place around 1961 in which Andy Warhol asked his friend Emile de Antonio what he thought of two paintings of Coca-Cola bottles that Warhol had recently completed. One displayed the soda bottle in the unembellished "cold" and formal manner that would later emerge as central to Warhol's style of Pop Art; the other, however, featured a frenetic cross-hatched surface with the kind of gestural brushstroke that a cutting-edge artist in

New York might have unreflectively adopted while under the sway of the still dominant style of Abstract Expressionism. De Antonio, who is the source of the story, wrote, "I said to Andy, 'Why did you do two of these? One of them is so clearly your own. And the second is just kind of ridiculous because it's not anything. It's part Abstract Expressionism and part whatever you're doing.'…that was almost the birth of Pop. Andy did it."[3]

Although Warhol did not immediately heed that appraisal, its justification soon became clear. For the "abstract expressionist Coca-Cola bottle," (Arthur Danto's appellation) was a stylistic mistake: the manner in which Warhol painted the work was inappropriate for its subject, even if it took the later emergence of Pop Art for the disjunction in that work between form and subject to be clear. In the Pop version of the Coca-Cola bottle painting, the style shows the depicted subject in a way commensurate with that subject's nature: the soft drink that is ubiquitous, the same for everyone, desired as much for brand-name as for taste, was aptly rendered in the hard-edged, anonymous, instantly recognizable and legible style of commercial advertising. By contrast, the representation of the bottle in a style associated with gestural brushstrokes, spontaneous composition, built-up surfaces and nonfigurative aims offers a point of view on the advertised image of the mass-produced soft drink that it does not seem to warrant. My second example of a failure of decorum is seen in Francisco Goya's major royal portrait of 1800, *The Family of Carlos IV*. It is a likely presumption in accord with such commissions that Goya intended to represent the monarch in a suitably flattering light.

However, the picture's awkward rendering of its subjects makes it difficult to see what it expresses as consistent with that aim. A viewer expects that picture would cast the royal family in a manner that conveys a putatively natural nobility, however what the picture actually shows is a rather ugly and undignified assembly with a puffed-up comportment and self-conscious ostentation in their dress. The elevated status of the royal family is no doubt indicated or symbolized by the appropriate trappings of dress and décor, but that status is not embodied in, or *shown* by, the picture. That is, we can infer to the status of the individuals from what we see, but we don't see an expression of that

status in the picture. The nineteenth-century critic Théophile Gautier reportedly described the painting as looking like "the corner baker and his wife after they won the lottery."[4] Goya's manner of representation foregrounds certain features of the King and his family but those features seem inconsistent with how the subjects should be seen.

   To explain such failures of fit, we might look to how style and subject were conceived in ancient accounts of rhetoric and decorum. From Aristotle, we learn that in describing something metaphorically, we must use the terms that are appropriate to the object, just as "we must consider, as a red cloak suits a young man, what suits an old one; for the same garment is not suitable for both."[5] And from Horace we learn of the three levels of style: plain, middle and lofty, the subjects that they are respectively fit to render, and the end (education, delight, moving an audience) each is directed toward.[6] These ancient treatments of decorum may be construed as offering only aesthetic imperatives, driven as they are by considerations of what construction of speech from the audience's point of view would appear (that is, merely *seem*) to be correct and thereby deliver the sought after response. But as the classical accounts' explanations of why a given style must not be used for a given subject make clear, the considerations that grounded the choice of an appropriate style were bound up with assumptions about the nature of, and hierarchy among, things themselves. The problem with appealing to these accounts in a general explanation of pictorial decorum, however, is that they only *describe* or catalog the aptness of style to subject, without explaining what that aptness consists in. We want to know what justifies the claim that some manner or style of representation is wrong for some subject or subject-type. What accounts for a failure of decorum?

   In what follows, I will use the term *subject* to identify what a depiction refers to, or purports to refer to (as in cases in which the subject does not exist). And I will use the terms *manner, mode, style,* and *form* to identify the way in which a given subject is represented.[7] Some writers identify that distinction as between the subject of a work and its *content*. An advantage of that way of employing "content" (instead of "form" or "manner," "mode," and so on) is that it makes plain the analogies among the way a picture has a content and the ways other sorts of representations, such as linguistic and mental representations,

have content. So just as we might ask, Is the content of this picture adequate to what in the world it depicts? we might ask, Is the content of my belief adequate to what in the world it represents? However, this notion of content is too narrow from the standpoint of making sense of pictorial decorum. The terms "form" "manner" or "mode" of representation are more appropriate, because they apply more broadly, capturing elements of a representation that, while not part of the content of the representation, nonetheless attribute features to the subject that is represented. A gigantic portrait may impute grandeur to the subject that the portrait represents, without the content of the depiction playing a role in that attribution. Furthermore, many features of a work of art do not attribute properties to its subject but may, nonetheless, provoke the charge that the subject should not be shown in that way. Consider, for example, the outcry in response to the 1997 *Sensation* exhibition in London for its display of Marcus Harvey's portrait of the child killer Myra Hindly composed from stamped or stenciled child's hand prints used (pointillist fashion) like basic units of color. The subject herself may have been sufficiently offensive to instigate the protests that ensued, but it was the emergence of the murderer's image from the impressions of children's hands that made the representation of her so unsettling. Here the concerns over the manner in which the subject was represented went beyond considerations of the content of the representation. The problem was the *medium* of representation. We may consider only a belief's content in judging the adequacy of the belief to its subject; but in the case of pictures, other considerations may play a role in whether the representation is apt. This point reflects a general feature of our interest in artistic representations qua artistic representations: we care not just for what is "said" or expressed about a subject by a representation, but, how that meaning is disclosed via the medium of the representation, that is, how it results from the manipulation of the medium.

One final caveat: How to describe the conditions under which a picture may be recognized as, may refer to, or purport to refer to, what it represents is addressed by several competing theories of depiction.[8] However, in the cases that follow, I take it for granted that even if a work's form may be inadequate to its subject, the depiction of the subject is secured. That is, my concern is not under what conditions

depiction is achieved, but under what conditions the *right manner* of depiction is or is not achieved. A radically inapt depiction of a subject might never be recognized as of that subject, and, indeed, may fail to refer to the subject at all. However, the violation of pictorial decorum I discuss in what follows is not a general failure to produce a representation of a subject (such as when the wrong subject is mistakenly depicted), but a more particular failure to produce a representation of the subject that is appropriate or fitting.

Three Defects in Depiction

With those distinctions in hand, we can now look at just three of the many kinds of reasons that may be introduced in a judgment that a representation fails to suit its subject. These are expressive reasons, cognitive reasons, and moral reasons.

   In the cases of the Warhol and Goya paintings discussed above, the reasons purporting to justify the failure of fit are *expressive*. That is, the flaws of those paintings are of a communicative sort. Each work instantiates an inadequate solution to the problem its creator encountered in how to represent his subject in a way that would express what was intended. This is just the familiar problem of an artist not finding a satisfactory way of saying what she wants to say. Aptness of depiction is a kind of achievement from which a work of art may fall short. In some cases, the problem is explained by how the artist planned her work, that is by how she thought of her aims. In other cases, the problem is due to the execution or realization of those plans. A work designed to be moving or profound may fail due to an inadequate technique. And a highly developed craft or perfect execution may not be able to save an inchoate or simplistic idea. Finally, some means that once allowed the successful achievement of a given end, may no longer suffice. An artist in the West, for example, who adopts a style whose period is over may not be able to express through that style what was expressed by those who originally formed it. Even if, for example, the nineteenth century Pre-Raphaelites had succeeded in adopting what they construed as the style of art before the Renaissance—in the course of which they thought art

lost its sincerity, simplicity, and integration with human feeling—they couldn't form the medieval style as artists of the middle ages had. For such medieval artists did not express via their style an anti-modern nostalgia for preindustrial times. Artists who resurrect a style don't just use it but, unlike the earlier artists, invariably refer to it as well.[9] In any case, even if an artist knows what she wants to express, there is no guarantee that the discovery of adequate means of expression will ever occur.[10]

A work of art may also exhibit a disjunction between represented subject and manner of representation for cognitive reasons. One sees this in, for example, cases in which the style of a work conveys false propositions about its subject or solicits toward its subject a distorted point of view. Most of Vigée Le Brun's paintings of Marie-Antoinette show the Queen with the conventional formality, regal air, and reserve characteristic of public images of the monarchy in the *ancien régime*. However, one important work from 1787 displays her sitting among her children as an exemplar of maternal tenderness and *sensibilité*. That composition, unlike the more conventional portraits, was roundly denounced when it was exhibited in the Salon. For the point of view on the Queen that the picture offered was rejected as artificial, being inconsistent with the haughty and extravagant identity she was endowed with in the public mind.[11] Contrast this with the case of Goya's portrait of King Carlos, which was *expressively* flawed in failing to show what Goya intended it to show. Lebrun's portrait, by contrast, realizes the expression it was designed to have. The objection of audiences was that what was expressed didn't seem true to life.

Lebrun's painting was perceived by viewers as a misrepresentation of part of the actual world. But we should not assume that the cognitive adequacy of a representation is always, or even often, a matter of isomorphism in properties between subject and representation. For a work may stand to its object not only as a visual representation, but as an expression or exemplification, and it may be in terms of those latter relations that its cognitive adequacy is judged. So there may be no isomorphism in properties between a beautiful work and the ugly subject that it represents as such; between a profound representation and the superficial reality that it captures; or between a striking image and the bland or non-descript person it depicts. For the beautiful work may accurately express but

not happen to show the ugliness of its subject, and the profound work may express the correct view that its subject is superficial, without the work being superficial itself.[12] When Warhol described the imagery of his paintings and silkscreens in saying that he "see[s] everything that way…[with] a kind of mental Braille, I just pass my hands over the surface of things" he was describing not so much his work, which was deep, as the superficial aspects of reality that it disclosed.[13]

A work of art may also be interpreted as cognitively misrepresenting a subject that exists in only a fictional sense. A film, for example, may present its hero as offering a deeply romantic and moving demonstration of his love (via the musical score, the effects he has on other characters, the extended close-up shots of his yearning eyes, and so on) even though that behavior would be identified by any objective standard as overwrought or clichéd. A painting may depict Helen of Troy in a manner that alludes to her supreme beauty, as shown, say, in a come-hither expression, a shimmering aura, and the stunned gaze of others, while inadequacies or peculiarities of the painter's technique nonetheless prevent us from seeing in the depiction a face that could launch a thousand ships.[14] A narrative may describe some sequence of events as if they were full of deep foreboding when any suitably sophisticated reader would find the unfolding of events predictable. Finally, an artist may inadvertently depict Hercules as wimpy, unicorns without horns, Little Red Riding Hood as wayward and culpable, or Satan as well-meaning but just misunderstood. If such representations were not intended to be counter-to-type or expectation, their failures would be of a cognitive sort.[15]

In some cases, moral reasons explain how a work of art may not represent a subject in an appropriate form. Even great admirers of the often astonishingly beautiful photographs by Sebastião Salgado of refugees, laborers, and others suffering from famine and human depredation have worried that they might solicit the wrong (contemplative or pleasure-seeking) point of view on the abject subjects they represent. Thus, for example, the critic Ingrid Sischy indicts Salgado for being too concerned "with the compositional aspects of his pictures—and with finding the 'grace' and 'beauty' in the twisted forms of his anguished subjects. And this beautification of tragedy results in pictures that ultimately reinforce our passivity toward the experience they reveal."[16]

Likewise, when the photographer Nicholas Nixon began in the late 1980s to exhibit a series of highly precise portraits of people dying from AIDS-related illnesses, viewers did not dispute the empathetic aims of the work, nor the visual accuracy of the series' depictions of its subjects' deteriorating bodies, but many held that the works failed to do justice to their subjects for showing them in a reductive manner, as if their disease was the most significant aspect under which they should be seen.

Finally, when the Colombian artist Fernando Botero, who is known for his popular paintings and sculptures of happy, chubby men and women, sought to respond to the news reports of US soldiers' abuse of inmates at Abu Ghraib, he created a series of gory paintings of anguished and tortured prisoners loosely based on the notorious photographs from the Iraqi prison. The problem in those paintings is that his sunny and sanitary style—so appropriate for his usual subjects— cannot fully accommodate the awfulness of the events the work refers to, and thus his stilted compositions fail visually to rise to the indignation he wants them to express. In that respect they veer close to being exploitative.

In each of these cases, the realization in a work of a morally or politically acceptable end is compromised by a morally defective execution or means. Of course, there are a wide variety of ways in which a picture may represent a subject in an immoral manner. Surreptitious photography, objectifying and obscene depictions, cruel caricatures, and showing a person in modes that her own self-representation would not sanction, are some of the many ways of creating a humiliating depiction. However, the interesting cases from the standpoint of understanding the nature of pictorial decorum are those that have at least morally neutral aims but, nonetheless, fail to depict their subjects in a morally acceptable manner.[17]

It should be noted that those different types of decorum— expressive, cognitive, moral or political—may be interdependent. When fifteenth-century artists sought to absorb the lessons of classical art, but worried that adopting its pagan style—using the form of Apollo to represent Jesus, for example—might compromise their work's contemporary Christian subject matter, their concerns for decorum were simultaneously expressive, cognitive, and (in their sense) moral as well.

Likewise, a moral realist might say that a failure to match form to subject from the moral or political perspective is just a cognitive failure of a certain kind (a failure in knowledge of what is morally required).

I hasten to emphasize that in all these cases, the charge that the subject is rendered in an unfitting or inapt manner admits of two interpretations. One is that the lack of fit is explained with reference solely to the nature of the subject; the other is that the lack of fit is due to the nature of the subject and the point, purpose, expression or meaning of the work. My concern here is with the second interpretation of pictorial decorum, that is, with constraints on how a subject should be represented that are supplied by virtue of what the work is designed and created to show or express.

In line with the first interpretation, one might hold the view that works of art ought to represent their subjects in a manner that promotes some particular value or realizes a certain end. One might argue, for example, that art ought to afford aesthetic pleasure; reflect progressive political aims; educate; flatter a sitter's vanity; promote love of country; expose tyranny; demonstrate the power of art; and so on. Under some conditions, evaluating a work of art as art with reference to its realization of one or more such goods or ends might be appropriate—as, for example, in those historical contexts in which art was commissioned and created to contribute to such ends. But it is very difficult to plausibly defend any evaluative norm as applying to a work of art by virtue of it belonging to its kind.

The narrower construal that I adopt allows us to appeal to constraints on appropriate representation that apply in virtue, not of any putative essence of art qua art, but of what a particular work of art is meant to achieve. Thus (on the construal of pictorial decorum I adopt) to claim that a work represents a subject in an inapt way presumes that the work has a certain meaning, expression, point or purpose with reference to which that way of representing the subject is wrong. The objectifying and demeaning portrayal of women that contemporary feminist art historians find in many Old Master paintings may be grounds for the ethical criticism of those works. But as those works were likely intended to reflect their assumptions about gender, they may not exhibit any failure of fit between their subjects and their forms. They may be morally

defective, but not, as such, artistically so. By contrast, we presume that such depictions of abject individuals as those by Salgado, Nixon, and Botero (as well as by other artists such as Diane Arbus) are not meant to be exploitative, even if their way of rendering their subjects leaves them open to that charge.

In any case, not just any lack of fit between a subject and the manner or form in which it is represented instantiates a violation of pictorial decorum. For in some instances such a lack of fit may be conducive to realizing certain artistic ends. The greatness of *Don Quixote* as a pica-resque novel for example, rests in part from the lack of fit between the style or form of the chivalric romance and the subject that is represented. Had Cervantes' work not meant, in part, to satirize a certain epic genre—that is, if it had a different meaning—we would find the subject a rather inadequate protagonist for the work's vehicle. So, the interesting cases from the standpoint of pictorial decorum are those in which the form of a work does not do justice to its subject *in light of the artwork's meaning* (expression, point or purpose).

I've described above how a work's form may be judged (in light of its meaning) not to fit its subject for expressive, cognitive, moral, and political reasons. No doubt, other reasons for a failure of fit could be introduced as well.[18] The question in what follows is what grounds such judgments of violations of decorum. Under what conditions does a work represent its subject properly and under what conditions does it not? Given that we are speaking of a conflict between form and subject, the phenomenon cannot be traced exclusively to one side or the other. Decorum is a relational concept and thus any adequate explanation of pictorial decorum would need to attend to both form and subject in relation to one another.

Concepts, Saliencies, and Point of View

One proposal for how to characterize the conflict between the subject of a work of art and its manner of being shown is to see it as arising from a failure of the appearance of the subject to fit within the constraints imposed by our *concept* of the subject. Kant posits a particular relation

of this sort in section 16 of the *Critique of Judgment* where he suggests that the concept of an object is internally related to what sorts of appearances with (or under) which it can be judged as beautiful. There Kant's distinguishes between what he calls "free beauty" and "dependent beauty" (also translated as "adherent beauty"): a judgment attributing free beauty to an object "does not presuppose a concept of what the object is [meant] to be" whereas a judgment of dependent beauty "does presuppose the concept of the purpose that determines what the thing is [meant] to be, and hence a concept of its perfection…" In surveying examples of what may be judged to possess free beauty, Kant refers to flowers, birds, crustaceans, music not set to words, "designs *à la greque*, the foliage on borders or on wallpaper, etc.," each of which he says can be judged as beautiful without any reference to the concept of what it is supposed to be. Dependent beauty, by contrast, is exemplified for Kant in the beauty of a human being, a horse, or a building, as he sees these kinds of thing being such that the concepts of their respective purposes, or ends, putatively determine under what conditions (i.e., with what sort of appearance) they can be judged as beautiful.

There are a variety of competing interpretations of this notion of dependent beauty, each with some textual support; however, one central way of understanding the idea is that it is associated with decorum in the appearance of an object. The idea, as explained by Geoffrey Scarre, is that when we judge whether an object is beautiful, we "should ask ourselves whether it is fitting that an object of its type should possess whatever features make it beautiful."[19] So, Kant writes, "much would be liked directly in intuition to be added to a building, if only the building were not [meant] to be a church. A figure could be embellished with all sorts of curlicues and light but regular lines, as the New Zealanders do with their tattoos, if only it were not the figure of a human being." (section 16.5).[20] Here, the concept of an object constrains what sorts of appearances are appropriate to it. If a particular cathedral is beautiful, there is a sense in which it is beautiful *as* a cathedral, as what an object of that kind is supposed to be.

If Kant were right in identifying such a species of beauty, that would point to another kind of constraint on pictorial decorum—an aesthetic constraint, that is, a specification of how a work's form may not

fit its content for reasons drawn from what makes something beautiful. The problem is that this would require subscribing to a theory of beauty as being more than a perceptual or sensory quality and there are good reasons to resist that view. One reason is that it seems we can see or judge something as beautiful without committing to any beliefs about what kind of thing it is, its causal sources, or its purpose or use. Another reason is that non-perceptual uses of the term "beautiful" can be best interpreted as indirect ways of praising something for being meritorious in some other sense, or as an exemplary instance of its kind. If, to the contrary, beauty is taken to be purely a perceptual property (even as it supervenes on non-perceptual properties), we can still say that some works ought to, or ought not to, represent their subjects in a beautiful form. However, the relevant reasons will then not be aesthetic but of another sort, e.g., expressive or moral.

Arthur Danto's account of "internal beauty," for example, suggests that sometimes the beauty of a work of art is a constituent of the artwork's meaning, as in, for example, the way the beauty of an elegy solicits a certain kind of attitude toward its content. The beauty of another work of art may be merely externally related to the work of art, i.e., such that it plays no essential role in the constitution or expression of the work's meaning. And, sometimes, given the meaning of a work, one or more particular kinds of beautiful form would be inappropriate.[21] When the original, largely neoclassical, design for the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum was radically changed to counter any perceived association of the building with triumphal or imperial architecture, even the critics of the original plan did not dispute that a neoclassical style could be independently beautiful or visually pleasing. However, they felt that it would be inappropriate, given the Museum's identity, to render it in that style, which might have "looked more like a monument to the perpetrators than to the victims."[22] Here the nature of that institution is defined in part by its purpose. And that nature constrains how it *should* appear. That judgment against the rejected Neoclassical style rested on moral reasons. However, it is worth remarking that, given that a moral failure in the museum's design would have also counted as an architectural failure, the normative aspect of that judgment is aesthetic as well.[23]

The above considerations suggest that any constraints that exist on when a subject is rendered beautifully are not drawn from considerations of what constitutes beauty per se, but from moral, political, expressive, and other concerns over when beauty, or a particular kind of beautiful form, is appropriate. However, we can make use of the relationship that Kant introduces in a more general fashion, as capturing how, when we judge the adequacy of a thing's appearance (that adequacy *not* here being limited to whether the appearance is beautiful) we do so via reference to a quasi-conceptual mental representation of the thing.[24] I will refer to such a mental representation as a *conception*. Used here simply as a general catch-all term, our conception of a thing may be composed of various beliefs, expectations, concepts (on a classical model), prototypical or stereotypical associations, assumptions of essential or central attributes, identifying roles or functions, and so on.[25]

I want to suggest that we can explain our judgment that there is a lack of fit between a work's subject and its manner of representation as consisting in a lack of fit between our conception of the subject and the point of view on the subject that the representation makes visible. By "point of view" I mean a way of seeing the subject with certain of features made salient and others downplayed or eliminated. The famous 1831 caricature of France's King Louis-Philippe as a pear, for example, made salient the coincidence of the King's head with the shape of a pear, large at the bottom and narrow at the top. Emphasizing his fat jowls and tiny head, the image implied he was both gluttonous and stupid. Here, the point of view the image adopted toward its subject did not visually falsify that subject, so much as make salient certain features of the subject at the expense of others in order to evoke our derisive response. When such foregrounded features of the subject are radically unusual (such as in Jonathan Swift's description of the skin of the gigantic women that Gulliver sees with loathing) such a point of view may interfere with the identification of the subject. But, typically, what a point of view does is present a recognizable subject as looking (and in consequence being) a certain way. Viewers of Lebrun's portrait of Marie-Antoinette approached it with a conception of queens as majestic, aloof occupiers of a dynastic role, not as individuals with their own domestic identities. And they thought of Marie Antoinette, in particular, in such

a way that her notorious personal vices were central among her features (i.e., as explaining her other features; as being essential to her, and so on). None of those qualities of queens, in general, or Marie-Antoinette, in particular, precluded her possessing the qualities of material tenderness and at-home modesty (she's adorned only with a pearl necklace) that the portrait tried to make salient. But the painting failed to make those latter features *sufficiently* salient such that the point of view on the Queen they comprised was persuasive or vivid enough to replace the point of view on the Queen viewers already had. The point of view offered by the portrait is associated with a structured set of saliencies in which the qualities of Marie Antoinette's domestic life were central, and the qualities associated with her notorious public life were made peripheral. However, that ordering of significance among the qualities attributed to her was rejected in favor of the conception of the Queen that viewers already had. In that way, the failure of the painting to get audiences to see the Queen as it was designed is like the failure of a metaphor or simile to succeed in getting its listeners to see one thing in light of another.

The phenomenon of an object seen from a particular point of view that is correlated with certain saliencies is not restricted, of course, to pictorial contexts. For features may be brought to saliency through any number of processes that get one to look at something in a given way, with certain emphases, or as having a certain aspect. Prompted by a simple analogy, ostensive reference, or by occupation of a literally different point of view in space or time, we may come to see something in a particular manner, as like another thing, or in light of certain prominent features. Accounts of metaphor, in particular, often stress how they do not so much attribute qualities directly to an object as prompt a listener to take a distinctive perspective on the object. Max Black, for example, calls the perspective that a metaphor offers a "filter," and Richard Moran speaks of metaphor as offering a "frame."[26]

The important difference (for present purposes) between our ordinary experience of finding certain features of our environment salient and finding features in art salient, is that works of art are typically *designed* to direct viewers toward finding certain features as salient in what the works represent. The works of art *present* their subjects from a certain

point of view, that is, with some features already made salient and ordered in relations of significance or relevance.[27] And a condition of our properly understanding a work of art is that we see the saliencies in its subject it is designed to show, rather than just any features that may emerge as significant because of our own interests (the way Swann in Proust's novel idiosyncratically judges paintings by Vermeer in terms of their represented figures' resemblance to his friends). To the extent that works of art are intended to convey any particular expression, experience, or meaning, they not only limit the features of their subjects that they present to viewers, but foreground certain of those features, or sets of features, and diminish others.[28]

Noël Carroll describes works of art, principally texts, in this way as "prefocused." His point, drawing on cognitive theories of emotions, is that works of art generate emotional responses from audiences through describing or depicting events, situations and characters in ways that make salient the features of those objects that are appropriate grounds (or criteria) for the emotion solicited.[29] For example, we can assume that an appropriate criterion of fear is what is harmful, i.e., fear is appropriately directed toward something that, from one's point of view, can be categorized as posing harm. Unlike objects in the real world, which typically are not created so as to be identifiable as harmful, an object in a work of art that is designed to provoke fear is depicted in such a way that those of its features that would tend to cause audiences to categorize the object as harmful are made salient.[30] Once audiences recognize the object with those saliencies, and thus under that categorization (with certain other conditions satisfied), they typically respond with the appropriate emotion. Carroll goes on to explain how such "emotionally governed perception casts its object in a special phenomenological light" which holds our attention to those emotion-appropriate features of the subject and directs our attention toward other features of the object that sustain that emotional response.[31]

That works of art may be prefocused (i.e., designed so as to present their subject with certain emotion-criterial features already spotlighted), explains not only how our emotional responses to such works are actually generated by the work, but how they can be objectively in accord with it. But that account need not be limited to just emotional

responses, for it applies as well to other attitudes figuring in an objective or work-governed response to the content of a work of art. A work of art may represent its subject with features made salient so as to both cause and provide the justifying grounds for a wide range of attitudes, points of view, or cognitive forms of appraisal such as credence, approval, offense, respect, distain, mockery, worship, disregard, interest, and so on.

Carroll and others tend to describe the responses that a work of art solicits as external to the work, that is, they describe the attitudes relevant to the interpretation of a work as what the work is designed to solicit, elicit, provoke, generate, and so on, in audiences. But this does not seem to properly locate those attitudes. For when a work solicits a given attitude in audiences toward what it represents, this is because the work already embodies that attitude toward what it represents. A work of art does not just represent its subject, it unavoidably represents it from a certain point or points of view, both in literal terms of what spatial perspective or perspectives is offered on the subject, and in terms of what is shown as significant in the subject, what is diminished, and what evaluative properties are attributed or withheld from the subject. If a work is designed so as to solicit a particular attitude toward its subject, then that attitude is registered within the work explanatorily prior to the role it has in being solicited from audiences. Indeed, it is because such attitudes or points of view are registered within the work that there is some objective constraint on what counts as adopting the right interpretative stance or stances with respect to the significance or meaningfulness of the events, objects, or states of affairs the work represents.[32]

Of course, a work may be designed such that it expresses one type of attitude toward what it represents but, in being so designed, provokes in audiences an attitude of a very different kind. Swift's *A Modest Proposal* is written so as to project an attitude of calm, rational endorsement of its content, but it is designed to provoke in readers an entirely different attitude of revulsion for what the satire exposes about their inhumane views. And a visual work of art, such as Robert Colescott's *George Washington Carver Crossing the Delaware* (a parody stocked with racist-caricatures of Emmanuel Leutze's history painting) may show a subject from a racist point of view, but that is clearly not

the work-as-a-whole's point of view, for such caricatures are critically directed at a bigotry in the culture at large. These kinds of cases don't count against locating the relevant attitudes associated with a work inside the work. For in such instances we have to distinguish between the *work of art's* attitude, and the attitude that is only part of the work's content.[33] That is, the approving tone of Swift's satire and the racist point of view of the painting do not characterize the attitudes of the works as a whole, only the attitudes that we would attribute to an implied narrator or its pictorial analog. The attitude the work expresses toward what it represents may be constituted by features of the work that include the attitude of an implied narrator or spectator, but need not be identical to it. We discover the *work's* point of view in part through assessing the points of view of the represented and implied attitudes it contains.

It is by virtue of the saliencies that are correlated with a given point of view that there can be a clash between the subject of a representation (the object or person referred to by the depiction) and the manner in which the subject is represented. That is, there are, on the one side, the features that we take to be essential to or typical of the subject. And, on the other side, there are the saliencies that are produced by the manner of representing that subject. These two sets of features, or their respective orders of emphasis, may be inconsistent. One possible result of such a clash is that we as audiences reject the saliencies supplied by the picture, in which case we say it is the wrong or inapt form. However, an alternative outcome is that the saliencies supplied by the form or manner of representation become dominant, forcing us to modify or replace our concept of the subject. In that case, the work of art may not be judged to be a violation of decorum (a failure to represent the subject in the way that is warranted) because it changes how we understand what is warranted.

Indeed, one of the ways in which a work of art may be said to change how we see the world, or what we see existing in it, is by succeeding in substituting the saliencies that emerge from its portrayal of a subject for the saliencies with which the subject is usually understood. Oscar Wilde's quip that London wasn't foggy until Whistler painted it suggests

how works of art may direct our attention to a subject's features that we had seen but weren't salient for us until they were represented that way. Tolstoy writes of how Vronsky commends Mikhailov's portrait for capturing Anna Karenina's "sweetest inner expression" even though Vronsky, Tolstoy wryly notes, "had learned of that sweetest inner expression of hers only from this portrait. But the expression was so true that he and others thought they had always known it."[34] When Picasso famously depicted Gertrude Stein using the style of an African mask, he offered a frame or perspective on her that both elicited a new way of seeing her visual features, and reorganized one's perspective on her non-visible features as well. When challenged that his portrait didn't look like Stein, Picasso is said to have replied, "it will."[35] Here art gives the rule to nature, rather than nature giving the rule to art.[36] When the subject of a representation, such as Stein, comes to be standardly associated with the features that a given style makes salient, it is akin to the production of a dead metaphor: one so apropos that it takes the place of other formerly "normal" ways of conceiving something.

This account of when we judge there to be a violation of pictorial decorum may seem to describe only the phenomenology or experience of looking at a depiction. But sometimes our conception of a subject is indeed reflective of what we would count as an essential property of the subject or of what is most significant in the subject from a given point of view—the way, e.g., the autonomy of a person is significant from a moral point of view. A particularly effective manner of representation may make other features of the subject salient, such that we come to see the subject in terms of those saliencies that override the saliencies that are grounded in the nature of the subject itself. In such a case, there is a temptation to say that the work instantiates a violation of decorum, even if our experience of it doesn't indicate any distance between how the subject is shown and how it should be shown. A work of art may render human beings in ways that seductively emphasize the identity of their flesh as delicious meat, but there are perhaps moral reasons and innate dispositions for why we typically do not and should not see human bodies in that way, with such saliencies, that is, from such a point of view.

Notes

1. "And it was not as if these were already there, in advance of poetry…and then later were only clothed in imagery by artists and given an external adornment in poetry; on the contrary the mode of artistic production was such that what fermented in these poets they could work out only in the form of art and poetry" (LFA 102; VA 141).

2. The proposal that works of art allow us an exclusive access to, and exposure of, specifically, emotions is significantly advanced in Collingwood, *Principles of Art*. See also Wittgenstein's suggestive remarks in *Philosophical Investigations* (§531): "We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.) In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these positions (Understanding a poem.)" (2001: 122).

3. Another version of the remarks is reported in Jesse Kornbluth, "Andy," *New York*, March 9, 1987, p. 42. See also Benjamin Buchloh, "Andy Warhol's One-Dimensional Art" in his *Neo-Avantgarde and Culture Industry* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 461–529.

4. This remark is discussed by Edward J. Olszewski, *Artibus et Historiae*, vol. 20, no. 40, p. 184, pp. 169–185.

5. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, Book III, chap. 2.

6. For example, "A comic subject is not susceptible of treatment in a tragic style, and similarly the banquet of Thyestes cannot be fitly described in the strains of everyday life," *Ars Poetica*, pp. 89–98.

7. In what follows, I focus on primarily figurative works of art that represent concrete (i.e., not abstract) objects. But there are other relations between depiction and depicted subject that partake of abstraction. An abstraction can depict an abstract subject; an abstraction can depict a concrete subject; a figurative work can depict an abstract subject; and a figurative work can depict a concrete subject.

8. Some distinct approaches are found in Nelson Goodman's semiotic account that sees images as purely conventional and denotative in the way they represent (*Languages of Art*. Hackett Publishing, 1976); Malcolm Budd's account of resemblance as a necessary but not sufficient

feature of representations ("How Pictures Look," in D. Knowles and J. Skorupski, (eds.), *Virtue and Taste* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1993]); Richard Wollheim's theory of "seeing-in" as a special perceptual skill that is conceptually and historically prior to, and explanatory of, pictorial representation (*Art and Its Objects*, 2nd ed., [Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980); supp. Essay V., and *Painting as an Art* [Thamas and Hudson, London, 1987]; Christopher Peacocke's account of depiction as wholly a function of perceptual experience ("Depiction," *The Philosophical Review*, 96 ([1987], pp. 383–410); Kendall Walton's theory that in appreciating a picture we use it as a prompt to imagine that we see in reality the object that the picture depicts (*Mimesis as Make-Believe* [Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1990). The theory that pictorial recognition draws on just the ordinary perceptual abilities that allow the recognition of things outside pictures is advanced by Flint Schier, *Deeper into Pictures* (Cambridge University Press, 1986); Dominic Lopes, *Understanding Pictures* (Oxford University Press, 1996). Lopes offers a "hybrid" theory of pictorial reference that accommodates intuitions from both perceptual/recognitional and causal accounts.

9. See my *Life of a Style: Beginnings and Endings in the Narrative History of Art* (Cornell University Press, 2000).

10. A repeated failure to discover such means might raise the question of whether there really is any particular content in what the artist is trying to say. The title of Merleau-Ponty's essay "Cezanne's doubt" alludes to this possibility of an artist working in an unconventional style potentially failing to create work that has any communicable meaning. Cezanne, according to Merleau-Ponty, "speaks as the first man spoke and paints as if no one had ever painted before," "Cézanne's Doubt," in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus, trans., *Sense and Non-Sense* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 19. For an interpretation of that remark, see my "Between Philosophy and Art," in Carman and Hansen, (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 291–318.

11. See Simon Schama, "The Domestication of Majesty: Royal Family Portraiture, 1500–1850," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. 17, no. 1 (summer, 1986), pp. 155–183. Critics scorned the picture as a forced and unpersuasive image of tenderness, and compared it unfavorably to other portraits of mothers and their children, including one of the painter herself with her daughter.

12. It was for cognitive reasons that Hegel claimed art had to harmonize its subject and its form: "the content which is to come into artistic representation should be in itself qualified for such representation." Without such harmony, Hegel suggests, the content of art (which he identifies across the board with Spirit) may be misrepresented in a "form antagonistic to its nature. Hegel adds that in art, unlike nature, the external shape or appearance of art exists for our apprehension: "[f]or this reason alone are content and artistic form fashioned in conformity with one another," Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. T.M. Knox, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 70–71.

13. Gretchen Berg, "Andy: My True Story," *Los Angeles Free Press*, March 17, 1963, p. 3.

14. See the sulky Helen in a painting by the Pre-Raphaelite Frederick Sandys (Walker Art Gallery, Liverpool). A.S. Byatt's fictional novel *Possession* suffers from the fact that while the story revolves around a poet of immense gifts, the poor quality of his poem that the novel presents (written, of course, by Byatt herself) seems inconsistent with the poet's renown. Contrast that with the *perfectly*-achieved middling quality of the poem Vladimir Nabokov attributes to his fictional poet of a minor reputation in the novel *Pale Fire*.

15. It would be a defense against such complaints on cognitive grounds for an artist to say she meant to depict those fictional entities in such a-typical ways. For an attempt to show an internal connection between the artistic or aesthetic assessments of a metaphor for aptness with a semantic assessment of its truth, see Hills, "Aptness and Truth in Verbal Metaphor."

16. The remark continues, "to aestheticize tragedy is the fastest way to anaesthetize the feelings of those who are witnessing it. Beauty is a call to admiration, not to action," Ingrid Sischy, "Good Intentions," September 9, 1991 *The New Yorker*. This echoes Walter Benjamin's charge in his "Author as Producer" that the artists associated with the *Neue Sachlichkeit* (an emotionally cool style of apparently objective literary and photography depictions) "make human misery an object of consumption." Benjamin accused specifically the picture book by Albert Renger-Patzsch entitled *The World Is Beautiful* with "turning abject poverty itself…into an object of enjoyment."

17. See my "Ethics, Aesthetics, and Artistic Ends" (*Journal of Value Inquiry*, vol. 38, no. 3, 2011) on the difference between images of humiliation and humiliating images, and the depiction-related reasons why a picture may be morally defective.

18. Adorno criticizes Brecht's anti-totalitarian play *Arturo Ui* on political grounds, saying that while the play is motivated by appropriate politically sympathies, it nonetheless represents Fascists in the wrong form: as buffoons. For that portrayal, Adorno suggests, construes Fascism as an accident or aberration, not a phenomenon explained by contemporary social institutions. He attacks Chaplin's *The Great Dictator* (1940) for similar reasons: the film, he says, "loses all satirical force, and becomes obscene, when a Jewish girl can bash a line of storm troopers on the head with a pan without being torn to pieces. For the sake of political commitment, [an accurate picture of] political reality is trivialized," Adorno, "On Commitment."

19. Geoffrey Scarre, pp. 357–358. Paul Guyer's account of this relation, which I adopt here, is that Kant's examples suggest that "the relation between the purpose and dependent beauty is a negative one: the purpose functions to constrain the forms which may produce the harmony of the faculties but *not* to fully determine them (Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 247).

20. By section 48, Kant concludes that all artistic beauty is dependent beauty: when we declare a work of art beautiful, "then we must first base it on a concept of what the thing is [meant] to be, since art always presupposes purpose in the cause (and its causality)."

21. Danto, *The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art* (Open Court), 2003. See also, my "Internal Beauty," *Inquiry*, vol. 48, no. 2 (2005), pp. 145–154.

22. Edward Linenthal, in his study of the debates around the creation of the USHMM. Quoted in Brett Ashley Kaplan, *Unwanted Beauty: Aesthetic Pleasure in Holocaust Representation*, p. 162.

23. At the inauguration of Rachel Whiteread's memorial to the Austrian victims of the Holocaust, Simon Wiesenthal warned those assembled that the site "should not be beautiful but should hurt." It might be odd to see as beautiful the cast concrete mausoleum-like structure, composed of four walls bearing impressions of 65,000 identical books with their spines turned inward, but Wiesenthal's injunction stemmed from the recognition that seeing the memorial as beautiful would wrongly imply that its relationship to the public is supposed to be harmonious, when its actual function is to be a standing indictment and reminder of what the nation had allowed.

24. There is, of course, a difference between asking what appearance is appropriate for a given object and what appearance is appropriate for the object as represented in a picture, and it may be that there are

normative constraints that apply to the appearance of an actual object that do not apply to the appearance given to the thing when represented in a picture.

25. So we can define the concept of a bachelor in terms of unmarried and male. But we would explain our *conception* of a bachelor in a way that would preclude or qualify its application to such people as the Pope, men in long-term relationships, teenagers, recent widowers, and so on. I should note that even if a conception of x is different from the concept of x, that concept may still have an ineliminable stability function in allowing different conceptions of x (over time, in different contexts) to serve as conceptions of the same thing. The concept of a bird, for example, may be what fixes the reference of our various conceptions of a bird. For defenses of competing theories of concepts, see Margolis and Laurence, (eds.), *Concepts* (MIT Press, 1999), pp. 189–206.

26. Black 1962; Moran 1989. See the concept of salience used in the explanation of metaphor in Andrew Ortony, "Beyond Literal Similarity," *Psychological Review* 86 (1979), pp. 161–180.

27. For elaborations of the notion of a point of view in terms of an operator that identifies only certain features of a given context as relevant in one's judgment or deliberation, see Robert Brandom, "Points of View and Practical Reasoning," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. XII, no. 2, June 1982, pp. 321–333; A.W. Moore, *Points of View* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Antti Hautamäki, *Points of View and Their Logical Analysis* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1986). On the objectivity of perceptual saliences see, Clotilde Calabi, "Perceptual Saliences," in David Woodruff, ed., *Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 253–269.

28. Visual presentations may be "reductive" in this sense: for they depict their subjects from one or more points of view from which the qualities that the subject possesses are presented as being essential to the subject. Although the construal of concepts as prototypes is highly controversial, pictures are often interestingly like prototypes in not just depicting a thing, but depicting it *as if* its visible qualities are necessarily or typically possessed by it (or as if the object is a central example of its kind).

29. Such emotions are taken to be cognitive to the extent that they are comprised both of beliefs and feelings. And such emotions are taken to be rational to the extent that they are directed at those things that serve as criterial for them (e.g., the emotion of fear is directed at those things that are harmful, the emotion of pity is directed at people who

suffer undeservedly). This view that emotions present the world to us as having criteria value-laden features is defended in different forms in P.S. Greenspan, *Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification*. (New York: Routledge, 1988); R. de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion* (Bradford Book, 1990); R.C. Roberts, "What an Emotion Is: A Sketch," in *The Philosophical Review* (1988), pp. 183–209.

30. Exceptions from the natural world would be those animals evolutionarily endowed with an appearance that has the function of warding off competitors or predators.

31. Carroll, "Art, Narrative, and Emotion," in Mette Hjort and Sue Laver, (eds.), *Emotion and the Arts*, p. 203. See also my "Aptness of Emotions for Fictions and Imaginings," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 2011.

32. Gregory Currie analyses the appropriateness of a reader's emotional response to a work of fiction as a matter of what he calls *congruence*: a fit between the reader's emotional response and the emotion expressed in the work. Currie distinguishes between being knowing what response is congruent with the work, and knowing whether that response is warranted on artistic grounds by the work. Currie, *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge University Press: 1990), p. 215 and passim.

33. See Robert Stecker, "Apparent, Implied, and Postulated Authors," *Philosophy and Literature* 11 (1987), pp. 258–271.

34. p. 477, Penguin Classics.

35. Roland Penrose reports the perhaps apocryphal story.

36. For an account that stresses art's way of developing novel forms for expressing new meanings, see Richard Eldridge, "Form and Content: An Aesthetic Theory of Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. 25, no. 4, 1985: 303–316. Despite their overarching critique of claims for the cognitive status of literature, Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen remark that that literature "constitutes its own form of insight" implying it can be cognitive in a way peculiar to literature (*Truth, Fiction, and Literature* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994], 408–409).

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